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Introduction  
The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum triggered a feverish debate 
over the future of the country and its role in the world. Critics of Brexit warn of a Britain stripped of 
much of its international influence, a country reduced to a pale shadow of its former self. i Advocates 
of Brexit, in contrast, paint a rosy picture. British “independence,” they proclaim, will allow a much-
needed reconfiguration of public policy. Rather than a retreat into isolation or obscurity, it marks the 
beginning of a new phase in British engagement with the world, an opportunity to establish, in 
Theresa May’s vacuous phrase, a “Global Britain” (Daddow, 2018).  
The Brexiteers are themselves divided about how best to achieve this ambition. Beyond disagreeing 
over Britain’s future relationship with the EU, they clash over the trading arrangements to pursue, 
the alliances to forge, and the kind of state that Britain should aspire to become. A number of 
prominent Brexit supporters have endorsed the idea of CANZUK, a union (or alliance or pact) of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. They claim that since these countries 
already have so much in common, and because they are already bound together by a dense web of 
security commitments, it is viable to create a globe-spanning zone of free movement of goods, 
services, and labour. Others argue that these initial steps should be followed by deeper integration, 
even the creation of a transcontinental (con)federal polity. 
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CANZUK is promoted by a small but well-connected range of policy-makers, journalists, business 
leaders, and politicians. So far, the idea has appealed chiefly to British and Canadian Conservatives, 
though it has also been endorsed by the Act New Zealand Party, and, in Australia, a former prime 
minister, a former High Commissioner to the UK, and at least one current Senator. Its supporters 
have developed a loose transnational advocacy network, establishing grassroots campaigning 
organizations, publishing policy documents, creating social media platforms, and recruiting 
prominent intellectual entrepreneurs to proselytise the idea. The array of economic, political, social, 
and cultural connections within the English-speaking—and also white majority—world that 
CANZUK supporters cherish is mirrored in the dynamics of CANZUK advocacy.  
This article analyses CANZUK as an attempt to develop a fruitful post-Brexit imaginary (Adler-
Nissen, Galpin, and Rosamond, 2017) and as a case of contemporary transnational elite advocacy 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). We begin by placing CANZUK in the context of wider debates over the 
“Anglosphere.” Building on this discussion, and also on interviews and correspondence with key 
CANZUK proponents, we then map the CANZUK advocacy network.ii Next we examine past 
plans for uniting English-speaking polities, tracing the idea back to late nineteenth century debates 
over settler colonialism. We show that the argumentative moves, institutional prescriptions, and 
rhetorical strategies, of CANZUK advocacy echo those of late Victorian and Edwardian imperial 
enthusiasts to a remarkable degree. We end by sketching some reasons to be sceptical about 
CANZUK. We also suggest that it cannot escape its historical origins: the empire continues to exert 
a powerful magnetic pull. CANZUK is a revealing symptom of some of the principal concerns 
animating debate over post-Brexit foreign policy.  
 
CANZUK and the Anglosphere  
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Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, elites throughout the West scrambled to develop workable 
visions of the coming era. Arguments for unifying or co-ordinating the Anglosphere formed part of 
the general intellectual tumult (Bell, 2016; Vucetic 2011). The general idea was not new – in the past, 
plans for unifying “Anglo” countries had travelled under various rubrics, including Greater Britain, 
the Anglo-Saxon race, and the English-speaking peoples. During the 1990s the idea was reanimated. 
The phrase Anglosphere was first coined, appropriately enough, in a science fiction novel: Neal 
Stephanson’s cyberpunk fable The Diamond Age (1995). Since then, and especially in Brexit-era 
Britain, the Anglosphere has become common political currency (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, ch. 6).  
Three basic models of the Anglosphere have been invoked. They differ principally along two 
dimensions: geographical scope and degree of institutionalization. The most capacious (and vaguest) model 
envisages the Anglosphere as roughly coterminous with the United States and the expanse of the 
mid-twentieth century British empire, though most weight is typically placed on the US and India. 
Call this the ‘empire’ model. Interest in deepening relations with the US is unsurprising given the 
entrenched Atlanticism of the British political elite. Some Anglosphere exponents, including John 
Redwood (2001), even argue for British participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
The renewed interest in the Commonwealth is more striking. Ideas about the Commonwealth, and 
in particular India, played a notable though ambiguous role in the Brexit campaign, and continue to 
generate interest among some Brexiteers (Namusoke, 2016; Murphy, 2016, Ch. 8). 
The second model defines the Anglosphere as a community or association comprised of the United 
Kingdom and a select group of its former settler colonies. It tends to be centred on a “core” of the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Some of its devotees are 
open to the possible future inclusion of other states (including India, Ireland and Singapore), though 
they are usually reluctant to provide any detail or a timeline. Call this the “settler colonial model.” 
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Thus in 1999 Robert Conquest suggested an “Anglo-Oceanic” political association “weaker than a 
federation, but stronger than an alliance” (Conquest, 2000, 225). A few months later Margaret 
Thatcher endorsed Conquest’s vision. “Unlike the European Union … an English-Speaking Union 
would be united by those deeper values - our common moral commitments to democracy and 
freedom tied together by our common language” (Thatcher, 1999). In the early 2000s this broad 
conception of the Anglosphere drew the attention of some senior politicians, including Tony Blair, 
Gordon Brown, and John Howard (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, ch. 6). Daniel Hannan, a leading Brexit 
campaigner, is amongst its most prominent contemporary exponents. He suggests a world-historical 
role for the people who “invented freedom”: “As a devolved network of allied nations, the 
Anglosphere might yet exert its benign pull on the rest of the century. Without that pull, the future 
looks greyer and colder” (Hannan, 2013, 17-18). The final model confines membership to the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Call this the “imperial federal model.” It 
forms the basis for discussion of CANZUK.  
A further important issue concerns the extent of Anglosphere institutionalization: the degree to which 
projects entail the creation of new institutions, or the deepening of existing ones. Plans range from 
those requiring little further development through to the formation of legal, economic, and political 
institutions to bind the constituent states together. On this issue, there is considerable variation 
between supporters of each model. Anchoring one end of the spectrum are minimalists who favour 
extremely loose and flexible arrangements – more network than polity, as exemplified by the 
American entrepreneur and author James C. Bennett (2004)iii – while on the other end are 
maximalists who want to fuse the existing states into a federal or confederal association (e.g. 
Conquest, 2005, 221-235). The same divisions emerge among CANZUKers. Many focus on 
securing trade deals, changes in visa regimes, and security co-operation, while the more ambitious 
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argue for the creation of fresh political institutions. The most radical plans imagine a new 
transoceanic state.  
The Anglosphere has typically been defined both positively and negatively. The positive case is built 
through reference to shared language, history, values, and culture, and a claim – sometimes explicit, 
sometimes implicit – about the superiority of the political and economic models found throughout 
the Anglosphere. The core countries are English-speaking, predominantly Protestant, liberal, 
democratic, and pro-free market. Negatively, the Anglosphere is often pitched as an alternative to 
European institutions, and especially the European Union. Many Anglosphere devotees regard 
Britain’s accession to the EEC in 1973 as both a monumental mistake and an act of treachery – a 
mistake because it ignored the weakness of the European project; treachery, because it spurned the 
true British “kith and kin.” Hence Boris Johnson’s 2013 criticism that “we betrayed our relationships 
with Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand” (Johnson, 2013; also see 
Wellings and Baxnendale 2015). Anglosphere discourse during the last couple of decades has been 
pervaded by a sense of historical injustice, and of the need to correct a tragic mistake. Since the late 
1990s a parade of conservative Eurosceptics have lionized the Anglosphere, in one form or another, 
as the best future for Britain, including Aaron Banks, John Bender, Bill Cash, David Davis, Nigel 
Farage, Frederick Forsyth, Liam Fox, David Willetts, Michael Gove, Daniel Hannan, Michael 
Howard, Owen Paterson, Boris Johnson, William Rees-Mogg, Norman Lamont, Austin Mitchell, 
John Redwood, Andrew Roberts, and Norman Tebbit (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, ch. 5-6). The same 
period coincided with the rise of conservative governments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the USA, which furnished a “sympathetic international milieu” for Anglosphere discourse (Kenny & 
Pearce, 2018, 133).  
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The term CANZUK can be traced back to the 1960s (McIntyre, 1966, 275), though it did not enter 
popular usage at the time. It re-emerged in 2016. The first to use it in the mainstream media was 
Bennett, in a USA Today op-ed published hours after the Brexit vote (Bennett, 2016b). He also 
penned the first programmatic book on the subject, A Time For Audacity, which appeared in both 
pre- and post-EU referendum editions. Bennett conceives of the CANZUK Union — which he also 
calls the “Commonwealth Union” and the “Commonwealth Federation” – as a “political federation 
having the character of a state, consisting of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, and possibly other Commonwealth Realms” (Bennett, 2016a). In part, the book reiterates 
key aspects of his earlier influential account of the Anglosphere, suggesting that revolutions in 
transportation and communication – above all cheap air travel and the Internet – have shrunk the 
globe, facilitating integration between like-minded groups. The idea is not just to deepen economic 
and political connections between existing allies, but to create a new form of state distributed over 
oceanic distances. A polity on this scale, and of this type, would be unprecedented in world history. 
Attentive to obvious criticisms, Bennett supplies answers to a catalogue of questions, including: 
“Isn’t this just re-assembling the British Empire?”, “Wouldn’t the Commonwealth Union just be a 
‘White Man’s Club’?,” and “What About the USA?” He also draws on the imaginative resources of 
speculative fiction, sketching “A Day in Life of the Union 2036,” an account of CANZUK’s future 
told from the perspective of eleven characters.  
The earliest prominent adopters of the CANZUK argument in Britain were Andrew Lilico, a Tory 
think-tanker and economist, who served as an advisor to the Leave Campaign, and the historian and 
journalist Andrew Roberts. Writing in The Times in June 2016 (Lilico 2016a) and again in the 
Canadian Financial Post in August 2016, Lilico outlined his vision for a “close geopolitical alliance” 
that would “allow its peoples to assert their very similar culture and values in the world as a major 
global player instead of secondary regional players ultimately subservient to others....When 
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CANZUK speaks, all would listen. Shall we try?” (Lilico, 2016b).iv A month later Roberts, long an 
ardent supporter of the Anglosphere opined in The Daily Telegraph: “Of all the many splendid 
opportunities provided by the British people’s heroic Brexit vote, perhaps the greatest is the 
resuscitation of the idea of a CANZUK Union.” Citing Bennett’s Audacity, he argued that “[t]o pick 
up where we left off in 1973,” we need “a new federation based upon free trade, free movement of 
peoples, mutual defence, and a limited but effective confederal political structure.” This federation 
would be “one of the global great powers” and a “pillar of Western civilisation” (Roberts, 2016). 
Claims about shared identity are central to all visions of the Anglosphere. The basic argument is that 
the social and cultural similarities between the countries provide a feasible basis for establishing and 
strengthening political and economic institutions. Identity is assigned priority over geography. 
Hannan often claims that while Europe may be physically proximate to Britain, the Anglosphere 
countries are closer in every other respect. “Why should we allow accident of geography to trump 
ties of language and law, habit and history, culture and kinship?” (Hannan, 2016). For Roberts, 
CANZUK “will be more like the successful federations the English-speaking world has known, such 
as Canada and Australia,” because they possess “the prerequisites for forming a parliament and 
government that could exercise control over their bureaucracies,” unlike the “uncontrollable 
quangos of Brussels.”  
Sir Roger Scruton’s famous dictum that ‘A nation-state is the widest span at which it is 
possible to be meaningfully good’ can be inverted with no loss of truth, for if there are a set 
a peoples who effectively share an idea of what public good is, then they will probably be 
candidates for a state, at least a federal one (Roberts, 2016). 
Geography is washed away in a techno-utopian dream of the immaterial.  
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Lilico, meanwhile, often describes CANZUK as “intimate.” It does not matter that as trading 
partners the US, EU, and even China, will all dwarf CANZUK, so long as the latter maintain “a 
common sense of ‘us’” (Lilico, 2017). He contends that this collective identity and purpose 
differentiates CANZUK from the other two Anglosphere models. The United States is simply too 
dominant, too large, and its constitution is insufficiently similar, for inclusion. As with Roberts, 
Lilico suggests that the United States and CANZUK would be close allies, not part of the same 
overarching political community. “CANZUK would be a partner, complement and occasional 
competitor to the US. The US cannot be in” (Lilico, 2016b). As has traditionally been the case in 
arguments of this kind, the other former territories of the British Empire would also be excluded. 
India, for example, has too much “historical baggage” with the UK – a characteristic example of the 
euphemisms that Anglosphere boosters adopt when discussing histories of violent conquest, 
exploitation, and domination – while the “Queen’s Realms,” a group of sixteen countries ranging 
from Antigua and Barbuda to Tuvalu, are too poor and have crime rates that are too high (Ibid.) 
Select Queen’s Realms could join the club if they adopt its rules; that is, “if they can raise their GDP 
per capita and reduce their murder rates” – “in some decades time.” They are condemned to the 
waiting room of history (Chakrabarty, 2000).  
 
Networking CANZUK  
CANZUK advocacy is a network phenomenon, albeit of a rather etiolated kind. In the scholarly 
literature, transnational advocacy networks refer to “actors working internationally on an issue, who 
are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and 
services” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 89). Individual actors include high-profile advocates like Bennett, 
Roberts, and Lilico, who share values and a discourse, even if they do not communicate frequently 
9 
 
with each other. Importantly, they tend to conceive of CANZUK as a long-term process, hence the 
preference by some for the term “CANZUK Uniting” over “the CANZUK Union.”v  
There are three organisations dedicated to CANZUK advocacy: “CANZUK International,” “the 
CANZUK campaign,” and “CANZUK Uniting.” CANZUK International, established in January 
2017, builds on the now-defunct Commonwealth Freedom of Movement Organisation. Standing 
behind both is James Skinner, a Vancouver-based paralegal, who in 2015 launched an online petition 
for freedom of movement between the four CANZUK nations. By mid-2018 this had 250,000 
signatures, and Skinner plans to submit it to Members of Parliament and Senators in the four 
respective countries.  The model for this deal is the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, signed in 
1973, that fateful year in the history of the “English-speaking peoples.” In line with the proposals 
described in the previous section, CANZUK International is also calling for a comprehensive 
multilateral free trade agreement, for greater intelligence, defence, and foreign policy cooperation, 
and for expanding the rights of CANZUK citizens in each others’ countries. CANZUK 
International claims to have staff in all four countries. The organization’s advisory board includes 
well-connected business leaders like John Bender, who heads an investment office in London, and 
Sir Michael Craig-Cooper. Skinner’s own politics are broadly conservative and Eurosceptic. Writing 
in September 2016, he welcomed Brexit as an opportunity to strike a Canada-UK trade agreement, 
citing potential increases in trade, investment and labour flows (Skinner, 2016).  
Launched in July 2016, the Edinburgh-based CANZUK Campaign backs greater CANZUK 
cooperation in seven areas: “Trade, Mobility, Trust, Diplomacy, Security, Research and Sovereignty” 
(2017, Our Platform). Its plan, outlined in a mere 1200 words, consists of identifying existing 
international agreements and suggesting they can be applied to the CANZUK countries. “Trade,” 
for example, is modelled on the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) 
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agreement, while “Mobility” is modelled on the aforementioned TTTA. “Diplomacy” invokes the 
Nordic template, specifically the creation of common embassies à la Berlin’s Nordic Embassies 
complex, while also noting that Canada and the UK already share properties in Baghdad, Monterrey, 
and Port au Prince. Although the campaign declares itself non-partisan, the language of its seven-
point plan contains mostly conservative platitudes: “shared values,” “efficiency and cost savings” 
and “parliamentary sovereignty.” Such tenets, they continue, will provide “clear sovereignty 
safeguards,” designed to protect against (presumably EU-like) “supranational overreach.” If upheld, 
they would be in tension with the more integrationist CANZUK proposals sketched by Bennett.  
The third organisation is “CANZUK Uniting.” Founded in 2016, this website is a “showcase for 
comment and analysis highlighting the affinities shared by these four countries, and the need for 
cooperation and partnerships between them – in both the public and private spheres.” CANZUK 
Uniting lists the following individuals as contributors and/or members of its advisory board: 
Roberts, Bennett, Lilico, the disgraced Canadian former media tycoon Conrad Black, historian 
Jeremy Black, the editor of Quadrant (and former editor of National Review) John O'Sullivan, 
Canadian scholar and political adviser Michael Bonner, the editor and publisher of The New Criterion 
Roger Kimball, Canadian commentator Brent Cameron, and Chicago lawyer and Bennett co-author 
Michael J. Lotus, among others.vi 
Several prominent politicians have also expressed interest in (minimalist) CANZUK proposals. In 
Canada, the list includes Andrew Scheer, Conservative prime minister-in-waiting, and his shadow 
foreign minister (and former minister of veteran affairs) Erin O’Toole. On August 25, 2018, 
Canada’s Conservatives hosted Hannan at their party’s policy convention in Halifax. They adopted a 
bullet points-styled resolution for realizing the following objectives “among CANZUK countries”: 
“a) free trade in goods/services; b) Visa-free labour/leisure mobility for citizens, including 
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retirement relocation; c) reciprocal healthcare agreement modeled on existing AU/NZ/UK 
bilaterals; d) increased consumer choice/protection for travel; and e) security coordination.”vii 
Should the newly introduced U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, falter, the Conservatives 
might also advocate for Britain to join a new North American trade agreement---a mid-twentieth 
century (Canadian) policy idea that Conrad Black re-floated in 1998 in report he wrote for the 
Centre for Policy Studies, a think tank founded by Thatcher (Black, 1998).   
In Australia, former Prime Minister Abbot authored a foreword for a 2017 Free Enterprise Group 
paper penned by James Cleverly and Tim Hewish, “Reconnecting with the Commonwealth: The 
UK’s free trade opportunities.” In it, Abbot endorsed “free-trade agreements with economically 
advanced Commonwealth countries.” As he put it: “The best way to ensure that free trade has few 
losers, even in the short term, is to begin with much freer trade between like-minded countries with 
comparable standards of living.” Alexander Downer, until recently Australian High Commissioner to 
the UK, and now Chair of Trustees of the influential Conservative think tank Policy Exchange, and 
James Paterson, Liberal Senator for Victoria, likewise support the agenda outlined by Abbott 
(Downer, 2016; Paterson, 2017). In New Zealand, CANZUK is championed only on the political 
fringe – by David Seymour of the Act New Zealand Party (Seymour, 2016).  However, former 
Prime Minister John Key can be described as CANZUK-curious. 
Individuals outside Anglosphere countries occasionally play a role in this advocacy network. A case 
in point is the French demographer Emmanuel Todd, whose theories on the distinctiveness and 
social effects of “Anglo-Saxon family structures” have become de rigeur among Anglosphere 
enthusiasts (Todd, 1985, 54-61). Todd recently embraced the notion of the Anglosphere to describe 
what he sees as the “heart of modern history in the years 1700-2015” (Todd, 2017, 37-39). Todd’s 
writings in turn are informed by the arguments of the historical anthropologist Alan Macfarlane, 
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another key source of Anglospheric inspiration. Hannan’s tract, Inventing Freedom, bears the imprint 
of Macfarlane’s work, while Hannan’s ideas have influenced Scheer (Geddes, 2017).  
The CANZUK advocacy network further constitutes itself as a transnational object via 
commissioned surveys. The trend was set in 2015 with a YouGov survey that found that UK 
citizens regard Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as the most desirable free movement partners, 
with 58% in favour and 19% against.viii Subsequent polls have yielded similar results.  One of the 
main drivers of this type of advocacy is the aforementioned Tim Hewish, who in 2015 oversaw the 
merger of his conservative Eurosceptic think tank Commonwealth Exchange with the venerable 
Royal Commonwealth Society, becoming the latter’s director of policy research (Murphy, 2017, 50-
1). The Society’s director, Michael Lake, is also notable in this context, for in February 2017 he 
inaugurated the society’s American branch by stating the ambition to eventually bring the US into 
the Commonwealth as an “associate member.” What hastened this extraordinary move was the 
election of Donald Trump, a self-professed (though highly selective) Anglophile, together with “the 
slightly dangerous but great fun opportunity that the 'Bad Boys of Brexit' offered” (Sherlock, 2017). 
CANZUK advocacy organisations, the Free Enterprise Group, and the Royal Commonwealth 
Society, are nodes in a larger network of think tanks that includes the Institute of Economic Affairs, 
the Adam Smith Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise 
Institute, Legatum, and the United Commonwealth Society (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, 147-148). They 
share a dependable practice of inserting the adjective “free” in front of market, enterprise, trade, and 
competition, signalling an endorsement of the neoliberal agenda that has done so much to shape the 
political economy of the “Anglosphere” in recent decades (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, pp. 82, 131, 161; 
Lawrence, Pegg and Evans, 2018). CANZUK can be seen as an institutional vehicle for helping to 




The Return of History  
What is remarkable about Anglosphere discourse in general – and CANZUK in particular – is how 
familiar it sounds. All three models were forged originally in debates over the future of the British 
empire that raged during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. CANZUK is the latest 
iteration of the once-popular idea of imperial federation. Of course, imperial federation and 
CANZUK are not identical. We concur with Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce that the meaning of 
the discourse wasn’t fixed permanently during the late Victorian era (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, 7). The 
political inflection of imperial federation and CANZUK, the breadth of support they mobilise, the 
demographic composition of the polities, Britain’s standing in the world: all of these (and more) 
differ in important respects. To take just the first issue, the political appeal of ideas about settler 
colonial (re)unification has narrowed considerably during the last century and a half. Imperial 
Federation originally attracted many liberals, while also enthusing a range of Labour figures, 
including Keir Hardie. Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson, among others, were as keen on the “old 
Commonwealth” as their conservative counterparts (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, 177-178). The 
Anglosphere of today is largely a politically monotone project, rendering its appeal far more limited. 
Our point is a different one. It is essential, we suggest, to acknowledge the imperial roots of the idea, 
both because such recognition situates CANZUK in the history of British political ideology, 
highlighting its notable precursors and its evolution over time, and because it helps to explain its 
magnetic appeal to some, its fierce rejection by others, and its general lack of salience. In particular, 
it explains why it is frequently seen by critics as a racialized project, a reincarnation of the old 
“white” colonial world.  Although the imperial origins of the idea do not determine its meaning, they 
do condition it, shaping the reception of CANZUK projects.ix Proponents of CANZUK cannot 
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escape this troubling history, however hard they might try. To imagine otherwise is politically 
myopic.  
It was during the 1880s and 1890s, in particular, that plans to consolidate the settler empire assumed 
a central position in British political argument (and a much more limited one in the settler colonies). 
Many leading thinkers, politicians, journalists, and imperial administrators, obsessed over how best 
to organise “Greater Britain.” “Imperial federation” encompassed adherents of a broad spectrum of 
positions, some complementary, others contradictory.  The Imperial Federation League (IFL) was 
formed in 1884 to propagate a vision of settler colonial co-operation and unification. It focused 
principally on recalibrating relations between Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, though 
concerns about the possible inclusion of the United States and Ireland were also conspicuous. 
British imperial territories in South Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa were largely ignored, although it 
was occasionally suggested that at some unspecified future date, they might warrant inclusion, once 
they had reached the requisite level of “civilization,” and even then they were to be assigned 
subordinate status. The discourse of imperial federation thus reinforced the dominant racialised 
conception of empire, insisting on the distinctiveness and superiority of the “core” white settler 
colonies. 
From the outset the movement was riven with discord over how best to understand the ideal 
arrangement of the imperial system. There were three basic models in circulation. The least 
ambitious called for strengthening existing connections between Britain and its settler colonies, 
emphasizing the depth of the cultural ties, and shared economic and strategic interests, while 
rejecting calls for deeper unification. This model ultimately won out, insofar as the colonies moved 
from the margins to near the centre of British strategic and economic calculations in the early 
twentieth century. Another group called for the creation of a new system of imperial government, 
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such that representatives from the various colonies would be elected to (or serve in some other 
capacity in) a reformed legislature. The plans differed over whether this would necessitate the 
modification of the existing Parliament, or whether a wholly new structure was required, but the 
basic idea was familiar: citizens (subjects) of the imperial polity should be represented in the 
legislative bodies that made decisions about their collective fate. This was the latest iteration of an 
idea that could be traced back to at least the eighteenth century. The third model was the most 
ambitious, its advocates endorsing variations on the theme of political unification, from 
confederation through to the creation of a federal state. (As with the current Anglosphere debates, 
there was much slippage between ideas of confederation and federation). All projects for imperial 
federation were premised on the importance of shared language, history, and culture – often 
characterised in terms of “race” – as the necessary social foundation for new political and economic 
institutions.  
Like their heirs today, advocates of imperial federation indulged in techno-utopian fantasies, 
premising their arguments on the radical political and economic opportunities fostered by 
technological change. The development of the ocean-traversing steam ship, and above all electrical 
telegraphy, altered perceptions of time and space. As the historian and politician James Bryce 
proclaimed, “[n]o such means of gathering, diffusing, and concentrating public opinion, of 
quickening its formation and strengthening its action, had ever been dreamt of before our own 
time” (Bryce, 1891, 19). The result, wrote Francis de Winton, the President of the Geographical 
Section of the British Association, was “an extraordinary condition of contactiveness” (de Winton, 
1889, 621). Geography, it was boasted, had been transcended. “Contactiveness” meant that new 
types of political communities and economic relationships were possible, and in particular, that 
ocean-spanning political associations could be built. As the historian J. R. Seeley wrote in 1883: 
“These new conditions … make it … possible actually to realise the old utopia of a Greater Britain, 
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and at the same time they make it almost necessary to do so” (Seeley, 1904, 74). The main bar to 
union, imperial federalists argued, was not geographical distance, nor lack of appropriate 
communications and transport technologies, nor the absence of shared identity or interests. Instead, 
it was political will. Campaigning organisations were formed, pamphlets written, rousing speeches 
delivered, networks of like-minded individuals established, scholars, politicians, and business leaders 
recruited to the cause – all with the aim of shifting public (and in particular elite) opinion. Literary 
fiction was put in the service of political ideology, with a steady stream novels published in the late 
nineteenth century imagining a future world lead by a united “Anglo-Saxon” polity. Indeed this was 
a key strand in the emergence of science fiction as a literary genre (Bell, 2020). Bennett’s foray into 
speculative fiction as political advocacy has a long pedigree.x   
Imperial federalists disagreed over geographical scope and degree of institutionalisation. Nearly all of them 
limited the proposed polity to the “white” empire, a core of settler states regarded as of equivalent  
“civilizational” standing. The United States presented one obvious challenge. Just as Anglosphere 
enthusiasts lament the rupture of 1973, so imperial federalists routinely mourned the eighteenth-
century split with the United States. Some saw the US as a necessary part of any viable imperial 
polity, though most rejected this as politically naïve and constitutionally illiterate, recognising that as 
a vast independent state  it was unlikely to want incorporation into a (con)federation (Palen, 2016, 
ch 8). Nevertheless, many imperial federalists harboured dreams of future Anglo-American 
reunification (Bell, 2016). Union was not disavowed, so much as deferred. In the meantime, imperial 
federalists argued frequently that Greater Britain and the United States should co-operate closely.  
Imperial federation was thus nested within a wider vision of the English-speaking peoples. Ireland 
presented another problem. Some imperial federalists, including Bryce, saw the machinery of 
federation as a solution to both the Home Rule crisis and the problem of imperial organisation 
(Harvie, 1976). Most, however, were adamant that Ireland should not be incorporated: it was either 
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too poor, or too rebellious, or too alien – whether in terms of religion, mores, institutions, or race – 
to warrant inclusion. The same reasoning was employed to exclude the rest of the empire.  
The imperial federalists also split on questions of economic policy and defence, issues that 
eventually tore the movement apart. For many, the idea of federation was principally economic. 
Some called for the creation of a Zollverein, others a system of preferential tariffs, while others still 
advocated a vision of imperial federation based on free trade (Howe, 1998, 213-222). In 1903 Joseph 
Chamberlain launched his doomed campaign for imperial tariff reform. Rather than a Zollverein – an 
idea he had earlier endorsed – he called for a system of reciprocal tariffs that would entrench free 
trade between the members while insulating them from outside competition. While the free traders 
won the day, the battle convulsed the Tory Party during the Edwardian era and helped diminish 
support for imperial federation. But advocacy of preference never disappeared. Indeed it was 
enacted in 1932 and lasted, in one form or another, until Britain joined the EEC (Kenny & Pearce, 
2018, ch.3). Other imperial federalists emphasised imperial defence, insisting that the responsibilities 
should be shared more equitably among members of the proposed union.  
The movement for imperial federation succeeded insofar as it helped to shift elite British attention 
towards the significance of the settler colonies. It formed part of a transnational drive to secure and 
stabilise “white” rule globally, the chief practical manifestation of which was the erection of 
racialized immigration controls (Lake & Reynolds, 2007). But they lost the battle to bring about 
significant institutional change. Plans for formal union fell flat. While the federalists managed to 
convince a significant number of senior politicians, they failed to gain enough support to enact new 
legislation, and opinion in the settler colonies – with some limited exceptions - was opposed to  
further integration with Britain, happy as many were to remain part of the empire. This reluctance to 
cede their quasi-autonomy was repeated when the issue re-emerged at various points during the 
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ensuing century. Although the first phase of debate was largely exhausted by the outbreak of war in 
1914, ideas about settler colonial integration persisted through the twentieth century, their popularity 
spiking at particular moments (Kenny & Pearce, 2018, ch. 4). As the United States grew ever-more 
powerful, and British influence began to wane, enthusiasm for imperial federation faded, and the 
wider conception of the “English-speaking peoples,” a fusion of the United States and Greater 
Britain, gained support. In 1946, Churchill called for “the fraternal association of the English-
speaking peoples” (Vucetic, 2017; Ledwidge and Parmar, 2018). But he was fated to watch over the 
initial dissolution of the empire, and the beginning of the end for the “kith and kin” project. While 
the vocabulary evolved over time, with “Anglo-Saxon race” morphing into “English-speaking 
peoples” and now the “Anglosphere,” most of the basic ideas have not. Today we hear a reheated 
version of arguments forged when Victoria reigned.  
 
The Romance of CANZUK 
Like the idea of the Anglosphere, CANZUK has had its share of critics. In the early 2000s, Michael 
Ignatieff dismissed Conquest’s proposal as little more than a “romantic illusion” (Ignatieff, 2000). A 
steady drumbeat of criticism has been maintained ever since. Sceptics usually suggest that proposals 
for uniting English-speaking polities are both fanciful and politically reactionary: fanciful because 
they advocate policies that are thoroughly unrealistic; reactionary because CANZUK represents a 
return to an old imperial vision.  
Thus far, little about CANZUK advocacy spells success.xi As an assemblage of grassroots initiatives, 
it operates with little money or technical expertise. The network remains concentrated on simple 
websites and social media accounts that generate content and analysis, much of it done by 
anonymous volunteers. The lack of political salience is evident. While several senior politicians have 
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endorsed free trade and movement among some or all CANZUK states, none of them have 
committed to any detailed policies. Indeed support for the former is compatible with a thorough 
rejection of what makes CANZUK distinctive as a project – bromides about the value of the 
Anglosphere, and the need for further co-operation between already-friendly states, fall far short of 
an endorsement of a political or economic association. As for media salience, CANZUK tends to be 
covered primarily as a curiosity. Skinner’s freedom of movement petition is a case in point. 
Although it received coverage by prominent broadcasters and newspapers in all four CANZUK 
countries – including ABC, BBC, CBC, The National Post, and TVO – this has been superficial and 
fleeting.xii 
Public policy communities remain largely unpersuaded by the benefits of CANZUK. Take the 
proposed trade pact, an embryo of which some see in the May government’s decision to explore free 
trade deal options with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. On the surface, this is good news for 
CANZUK supporters. But if we follow gravity models in economics – studies that point to an 
outsized negative effect of geographic distance on trade – we can appreciate why Australian exports 
to Britain have for decades hovered below two percent of its total outgoing trade and why only for 
New Zealand would a CANZUK pact count as “the most important” (Ravenhill & Heubner, 2019). 
In part, this explains why during the Brexit campaign, the leaders of all of the CANZUK countries 
supported Britain remaining in the EU. They do not see the huge benefits professed by 
CANZUKers. While the coming years may in fact see the aforementioned Canada-UK trade 
agreement and similar deals, they are unlikely to make a substantial difference to existing levels of 
trade. 
A CANZUK defence pact is even less likely. It is true that institutions such as the Five Eyes and 
ABCANZ demonstrate the extensive and durable security co-operation between Australia, Canada, 
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New Zealand, and the UK (Legrand, 2019; Vucetic, 2019). However, this also means that such a 
pact would function only if the US were to support it logistically and politically – hardly an 
endorsement of Roberts’ vision of CANZUK as “one of the global great powers.” Furthermore, it is 
illusory to think that an alliance with Britain would ever again become Australia’s main strategic 
priority, just as it is illusory to expect that Canada and the UK would re-orient their defence postures 
away from the Atlantic and towards the Asia-Pacific region.  
The other major criticism of CANZUK is that it is politically reactionary, a racialized throwback to 
the days of the British empire (Shaw, 2008, 127; Murphy, 2017, Ch.8). A recent editorial in The Globe 
& Mail, a leading Canadian newspaper, exemplifies this position. It noted that despite much talk 
about the post-Brexit significance of the Commonwealth, the attention of “[p]arts of the British 
right” has largely been focused on the old settler colonies. “It’s a funny thing … These Tory 
visionaries seem most enamoured of ex-Dominions where white people predominate. There’s even 
a silly name – Canzuk – for this bloc-within-a-bloc” (Globe & Mail, 2018). And yet, the editorial 
continued, the dreams of both a reanimated Commonwealth and of CANZUK are little more than 
“a fantasy.” There is simply no appetite for them, either in the former Dominions or those 
“countries with a harsher and more recent colonial history.” Attempts to revivify old imperial ties as 
the basis for British foreign and trade policy are both hopeless and smack of “neo-colonialism” 
(Globe & Mail, 2018). 
The leading CANZUKers recognise that “historical baggage” is the hardest framing challenge. 
Accordingly, many of them stress novelty and discontinuity. Bennett has always argued that his 
projects for English-speaking unification are non-hierarchical and “precisely the reverse” of empire 
(Bennett, 2007). Lilico, meanwhile, contends that CANZUK is “something completely new,” rather 
than a revival of the imperial preferential trading system or “some reheated latter-day British 
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Empire.”xiii Such claims disregard history. The linkages between past and present ideas are clear –
what is most striking is how little about CANZUK is new. Asserting that CANZUK is not a 
reheated version of the Victorian Empire is a red-herring. After all, it was commonplace in the late 
nineteenth century to deny that imperial federation designated the empire as a whole. It was 
“fundamental,” Seeley proclaimed, to recognise that “our [settler colonial] Empire is not an Empire 
at all in the ordinary sense of the word” (Seeley, 1904, 51). Empire, he suggested, was an appropriate 
term for Britain’s relationship with India, not with Canada and Australia. CANZUK disavowals of 
imperialism – as it is usually understood – are thus both correct and irrelevant. It is a reheated 
version of a specific settler colonial vision. 
Virtually all CANZUK supporters stress the inclusive, multicultural character of CANZUK societies 
and CANZUK supporters. (In doing so, they present a rose-tinted view of the racial politics of 
CANZUK societies, all of which continue to suffer from structural forms of racism). But they 
cannot transcend the imperial history that originally furnished projects of settler colonial unity –
projects that buttressed the creation of a “white man’s world” (Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Schwartz, 
2011). CANZUK is the latest variant of a long line of projects seeking to consolidate the British 
settler empire, projects that were until deep into the second half of the twentieth century justified in 
explicitly racist terms, as variations on the theme of white supremacism. This history invariably 
shapes interpretations of CANZUK, whatever the intentions behind it. Hence the scepticism of the 
Globe & Mail editorial. And hence Philip Murphy’s argument that elements of the Brexit campaign 
sought “to revive an older mythology of white-British racial solidarity dating from the early decades 
of the twentieth century” (Murphy, 2017, 198). It is naïve to imagine that this history can be 
transcended by simply asserting its irrelevance.xiv CANZUK supporters likewise struggle to address 
questions of hierarchy and of coloniality as a present condition. Indeed, while they boast about the 
wealth and resources that make “core” English-speaking states worthy of unity today, they tend to 
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ignore how that wealth accumulation was predicated on imperial processes that included economic 
and ecological devastation, the creation of enduring divisions and inequalities, and widespread 
violence, including the mass killing of indigenous populations. CANZUK societies still live with the 
consequences of this history. It cannot be wished away. 
Denying the clear historical echoes of the idea also sits awkwardly with the enthusiasm for British 
imperialism expressed by other leading CANZUKers. Roberts, for example, contends that 
CANZUK is modelled on “the dream of early 20th century giants such as Joseph Chamberlain” 
(Roberts, 2016). A proud defender of British imperialism, he has attacked “politically correct” 
expressions of “colonial guilt,” maintaining that the British should celebrate their imperial deeds 
(Roberts, 2013). Such claims have long been popular among advocates of the wider Anglosphere. 
Niall Ferguson made a name for himself celebrating the British empire and its legacy. For Hannan, 
Britain’s imperial identity was fundamentally liberal and a valuable “antibody against the infections 
of slavery and dictatorship”; given that “the independence struggles have almost faded from 
memory,” the Anglosphere can be promoted without fuss (Hannah, 2013a, chs. 7, 9). Johnson has 
not hidden his admiration for the empire. “Africa may be a blot, but it is not a blot upon our 
conscience. The problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge any 
more” (Johnson, 2002). Although he later apologised for this remark, there is little sign that he 
rejects this kind of neoimperial posturing. While not all advocates of CANZUK and the 
Anglosphere celebrate the British empire, the fact that some of its most high-profile supports do 
hinders the case for enacting a radical break with the past. It serves to highlight the continuities in 
sensibility, ideas, and proposals.  
CANZUK then, is at once new and old. Although it has (re)emerged in the wake of Brexit, its 
conceptual roots, and many of its animating concerns and ideas, can be traced to the imperial 
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debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Then, as now, dreams of settler colonial 
unity reveal far more about the ideological practices of English-speaking elites than they do about 
economic and geopolitical realities. CANZUK serves as a window into the assumptions, interests, 
and dreams, of some of those seeking to maintain Britain’s – or the “English-speaking peoples” – 
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i  Earlier versions of this article benefitted from the presentation at the 59th Annual Convention of 
the International Studies Association in San Francisco, California, April 4-7, 2018, and from the 
comments and criticisms by Mark Laffey, Oliver Daddow, Sean Fleming, Marc-William Palen, 
Robert Saunders, Michael Lotus, James Bennett, and two anonymous reviewers. All the usual 
disclaimers apply. 
ii CANZUK proponents were interviewed either in person, in June 2017 in London, and/or over 
Twitter and email from February 2017 to November 2018. See subsequent footnotes for further 
details.   
iii Bennett did more than anyone to popularise the term Anglosphere, though his own conception of 
it differs from most others in important respects, not least in its partially deterritorialised character.  
iv Lilico has since written dozens of op-eds and blog posts on the topic, while vigorously promoting 
the idea on social media. His CANZUK is nested in a “broader and looser” Anglosphere that also 
includes “the Caribbean and possibly Ireland”; an “ever closer union” akin to the EU, albeit without 
the latter’s bureaucracy and regulations; a “deep geopolitical partnership” with similarities to the 
“Warsaw Pact partnerships of the 1970s” (Lilico, 2017).  Correspondence with Lilico over Twitter 
and email, February-March 2017 led us to his CANZUK posts on Reaction, 
https://reaction.life/author/andrew_lilco/, on CANZUK Uniting 
https://www.canzuk.co.uk/home-1/author/ (both last accessed 12 December 2017).   
v As Michael Lotus puts it: “The term CANZUK reflects a cluster of potential revisions to the 
relationships between the four countries.” E-mail correspondence, 14 January 2018. Also from 
similar correspondence with Lilico in March 2016 and with Lotus and Bennett in December 2017 
and again in November 2018.  
vi In the months after the Brexit vote, there was some talk of a group of “CANZUK Union 
Institutes,” but the idea is currently dormant. E-mail correspondence with Bennett and Lotus, 
November 2018.  




                                                                                                                                                                                           
viii Compared to the equivalent scenarios involving the US (45% for, 27% against) and the existing 
arrangement with the EU (46% for, 35% against). YouGov survey of 11-12 November 2015, cited 
in Lilico (2017).  
ix This is also true of the wider Anglosphere discourse (Bell, 2019; Vucetic, 2019). 
x Today, transport and communications technology, and the purported collapse of time and space, 
remain central, to visions of the Anglosphere. The internet, in particular, has drawn the attention of 
many of them, and in particular Bennett (2000) and Hannan (2013). 
xi According to Keck and Sikkink (1998, Introduction, 204-7), “density” refers to both the number 
of organizations in a network and to the strength of the connections within it. In addition to density, 
advocacy success further depends on the public resonance of activists’ claims.  
xii It is also covered by the far right outlets like The Rebel in Canada. Even if the number of 
signatories were to quintuple, this still pales in comparison to, for example, several anti-Brexit 
petitions in the UK.  
xiii Lilico (2016); Twitter and e-mail exchange with Lilico, March 2017. 
xiv On the need to locate debates over the Anglosphere in relation to question of public memory 
about empire, and the ‘imperial history wars,’ see Bell (2019). 
